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a b s t r a c t
The closure of borders and traditional commerce due to the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to have
a lasting financial impact. We determine whether the growth in COVID-19 affected index prices by
examining equity markets in five regional epicentres, along with a ‘global’ index. We also investigate
the impact of COVID-19 after controlling for investor sentiment, credit risk, liquidity risk, safe-haven
asset demand and the price of oil. Despite controlling for these traditional market drivers, the daily
totals of COVID-19 cases nevertheless explained index price changes in Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Similar results were not observed in China, the origin of the virus, nor in the
‘global’ index (MSCI World). Our results suggest that early interventions (China) and the spatiotemporal
nature of pandemic epicentres (World) should be considered by governments, regulators and relevant
stakeholders in the event of future COVID-19 ‘waves’ or further extreme societal disruptions.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
COVID-19 originated in China in late 2019 and was declared
s a global pandemic by the World Health Organisation on March
2th 2020 (WHO, 2020a). The current outbreak of COVID-19 has
rguably been the greatest health crisis, to date, of the 21st cen-
ury, prompting travel restrictions, stay-at-home orders and an
nprecedented shutdown of global commerce. As of September
8th 2020, global cumulative cases stood at 33,178,019 with
98,784 recorded deaths, amounting to a fatality rate of approx-
mately 3.5% (ECDC, 2020). From Table 1, it can be seen that
lthough the virus is not significantly more fatal than preceding
iral outbreaks, the transmission rate of COVID-19 is currently
stimated to be substantially higher.
With this higher rate of transmission, the economic impact
as been notably more severe relative to past outbreaks. On
arch 12th 2020, both the Dow Jones and S&P 500 experienced
heir worst trading days since Black Monday of 1987, falling
ver 9% and subsequently hitting 52-week lows (Stevens et al.,
020). However, large stock market losses were accompanied by
imilarly large upward movements throughout March, as mar-
ets reacted turbulently to developments in the outbreak, among
ther market factors. Table 2 illustrates the reaction of the S&P
00 and the peak-to-trough price movement of the index during
ecent major viral outbreaks. Table 2 highlights COVID-19 as the
∗ Corresponding author.
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214-6350/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access amost significant outbreak to affect financial markets this century,
by a substantial margin.
In this study, we undertake a number of multiple linear re-
gression analyses to investigate the relationship between growth
in COVID-19 and stock market index prices across a number of re-
gions. We include data from December 2019 to June 2020, which
encapsulates the exponential rise in COVID-19 cases and the
subsequent ‘flattening’ of the infection curve (Fig. 1). The regions
we include are China, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and an index measuring the global impact of COVID-19.
We utilise a multiple linear regression analysis as it models the
linear relationship between a number of potentially-influential
independent variables and a specific dependent variable. This
makes it suitable to analyse whether growth in COVID-19 itself
was significantly associated with index prices, using the total
number of COVID-19 cases and a selection of theoretical market
determinants as control variables.
The manner through which COVID-19 affected equity markets
can be attributed to a conglomeration of market factors. Trading
volumes and subsequent volatilities spiked to levels not seen
since 2008 (Baker et al., 2020). Gold and oil markets may have
served as flight-to-safety assets (Corbet et al., 2020), warranting
their inclusion, while fixed-income markets underwent signifi-
cant turbulence (Schrimpf et al., 2020). External market factors
may have exacerbated proceedings — the tension in global oil
markets between Saudi Arabia and Russia, for example, may have
propagated the distress of an already volatile market (Ashraf,
2020).
A number of studies have emerged in the first quarter of
2020 examining the impact of COVID-19 on financial markets.rticle under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).






























Fatality and transmission rates of major viral outbreaks. The fatality rate of
COVID-19 is not significantly higher than previous outbreaks. However, current
estimates of the transmission rate (R0) indicate as many as 5.7 cases generated
for each new case.
Source: [1] WHO (2003), [2] Dawood et al. (2012), [3] WHO (2019), [4] WHO
2020b), [5] Da Cunha et al. (2017), [6] ECDC (2020), [7] Coburn et al. (2009),
8] Poletto et al. (2014), [9] Khan et al. (2015), [10] Towers et al. (2016), [11]
anche et al. (2020).
Year Outbreak Fatality rate R0 (Transmission rate)
2003 SARS[1] 11% 3.0[1]
2009 Swine Flu[2] 1% 1.6[7]
2012 MERS[3] 35% 0.5[8]
2014 Ebola Virus[4] 50% 1.7[9]
2016 Zika Virus[5] 8% 3.8[10]
2020 COVID-19[6] 3.5% 5.7[11]
Table 2
S&P 500 Index price movements during major viral outbreaks. Peak-to-trough
losses were almost two-fold during COVID-19 when compared to SARS. Notably,
taking just 23 trading days versus 38.
Source: [12] Citi Market Insights (2020); [13] Bloomberg
Year Outbreak Peak-to-Trough returns Trading days
2003 SARS[12] −17.3% 38
2009 Swine Flu[13] −5.8% 9
2012 MERS[12] −7.3% 43
2014 Ebola Virus[12] −5.8% 23
2016 Zika Virus[12] −12.9% 66
2020 COVID-19[13] −33.7% 23
Among the methodologies used, it appears that panel regression
analysis and event-study regressions are currently the favoured
methods. Panel data analysis is widely used in both epidemiology
and econometrics, making it an appropriate methodology for the
current COVID-19 pandemic. Using panel data spanning January
to April, Ashraf (2020) found that stock markets reacted strongly
to growth in confirmed cases, but not to confirmed deaths. On
the other hand, Ali et al. (2020) conducted bivariate regressions
and found returns to be negatively and significantly related to
COVID-19 deaths.
Examining Chinese stock markets, Al-Awadhi et al. (2020)
sed a panel regression analysis and found that both the daily
rowth in confirmed cases and fatalities resulted in statistically
ignificant negative returns on stock markets. Empirical results
rom Zhang et al. (2020) indicated that COVID-19 directly im-
acted volatility on stock markets worldwide. Additionally, Baker
t al. (2020) used textual analysis in their assessment of the
tock market impact of COVID-19. Analysing newspaper articles
ublished with relevant keywords, the authors’ findings suggest
hat no infectious disease outbreak as far back as 1900 had af-
ected stock markets to the same extent as COVID-19. They found
hat news related to COVID-19 (both positive and negative) was
he dominant driver of large daily U.S. stock market movements
etween late February 2020 and April 2020.
This study adds to the current literature in several ways.
irstly, we differ from the aforementioned research (Al-Awadhi
t al., 2020; Ashraf, 2020) as we not only test the relationship
etween cases and returns, but also measure the significance
f COVID-19 while controlling for several conventional market
rivers. These drivers range from trading volumes to volatility
ndicators to safe-haven assets to fixed-income market indica-
ors. In contrast, Ashraf (2020) includes variables that control for
emocratic accountability, investment freedom and GDP.
Secondly, this study adds to the literature set by encom-
assing the entire ‘first wave’ of COVID-19 transmission in each
espective territory (Fig. 1). Capturing data over the December
019 to June 2020 period thus facilitates a robust analysis into
he reaction of stock markets as growth in the virus began,2
surged, peaked, and eventually slowed. Thirdly, another approach
to COVID-19 studies has been the utilisation of event study anal-
ysis to assess the market’s immediate reaction (Liu et al., 2020).
However, this methodology assumes the market’s initial reaction
to events reflects their true economic impact in an unbiased
manner (Oler et al., 2008). To capture the full extent of the
pandemic’s first wave, we make use of a linear regression model
rather than an event study analysis.
Recent literature has described the COVID-19 pandemic
as a stock market black swan event (Morales and Andreosso-
O’callaghan, 2020). Caution must be heeded if treating the COVID-
19 pandemic as a black swan event as there may be a subsequent
failure to adequately prepare for future pandemics, or another
event that results in global societal upheaval. The rarity and
exceptional nature of ‘black swan’ events can be used as an
argument to reject the likelihood and severity of future reoc-
currences. Thus, the ‘black swan’ label may detract focus from
the necessary risk analysis and predictive modelling that must
be carried out following such events. Goodell (2020) explored
agendas for future COVID-19 research, arguing that it is likely that
there will be a substantial reaction from financial markets in the
event of another sudden and significant viral outbreak. Travel re-
strictions, social distancing measures and temporary shutdowns
of commerce are expected to be the standard course of action
when a novel pathogen inevitably emerges once more (Bearman
et al., 2020; Khanna et al., 2020). Therefore, it is imperative that
the financial impact of pandemics is further investigated.
The true economic impact of COVID-19 will remain unseen
for some time. At the time of writing, countries are beginning
to ease lockdown restrictions as people slowly return to work.
With this, countries are only now beginning to take stock of
the economic, social, and political costs of both the pandemic
and the subsequent economic shutdown. Stringent regulations
in the wake of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis have left
banks more capitalised, potentially allowing for a quick economic
recovery. Nevertheless, a report by the Bank of England (2020b)
estimated a GDP contraction of 25% in Q2 2020 with an estimated
contraction of 14% by year-end. Similar estimates of 20%–30%
were announced by the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Jerome
Powell (2020). This coincided with predictions from the IMF
(2020a) that the COVID-19 recession will likely be the worst since
the Great Depression.
However, before the long-term economic impacts can be
quantified, an analysis into the short-term stock market implica-
tions is warranted. Global stock market losses of $16 trillion were
observed in less than a month as the pandemic took hold and as
fears rose of a worldwide recession (Gandel, 2020). As such, an
analysis into the determinants of global stock market indices as
COVID-19 grew will provide valuable insights into the evolving
market dynamics and price drivers during times of crisis and
uncertainty. The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes
the data sources and parameter selections for the regression
models. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology used in
the investigation. Section 4 presents the results and discusses
the implications of these findings in the context of contemporary




Daily data of cumulative case numbers and fatalities from
COVID-19 was sourced from the European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control (ECDC, 2020). The data spanned the date
range of 31st December 2019–10th June 2020, corresponding

























Fig. 1. The daily number of new COVID-19 cases in each territory from December 31st 2019 to June 10th 2020. An exponential rise is observed for each country
o varying extents. The entire ‘first wave’, often referred to in epidemiology appears to have been captured for China, Italy, Spain, and the U.K. For global data and
ata for the U.S.A., this curve appears to have been captured to a lesser extent.o n = 117 trading days. The data was then transformed to
rovide eight daily indicators of COVID-19 growth that may have
nfluenced stock market indices, outlined below:
Cases: Deaths:
Total number of cases Total number of deaths
Growth in total number of
cases
Growth in total number of
deaths
Number of new cases Number of new deaths
Growth in number of new
cases
Growth in number of new
deaths
Growth rates are represented as a daily arithmetic growth
ate, in line with the reporting methods used by several media
utlets throughout the pandemic (Bruce and James, 2020; Cullen,
020; Harrison, 2020). Preliminary testing of the eight COVID-
9 indicators against index prices revealed ‘Total Cases’ as the
ighest correlated variable when averaged across the territories
Table 3). The remaining seven growth indicators are disregarded,
ince they are all either highly correlated with Total Cases, or
ncorrelated with index prices.
The territories chosen for this analysis are China, Italy, Spain,
he United Kingdom, the United States, and a measure for the
lobal impact of COVID-19. The equity indices associated with
hese territories, as well as the justification for their inclusion,
re outlined in Table 4. The prices associated with each equity
ndex were obtained through Bloomberg. To align calendar days
ith trading days, COVID-19 case numbers reported on weekends
ere added to the next trading day’s figures. Essentially, this is to
ap into investor sentimentality and the reaction of stock market
rices following an accumulation of news over the weekend
eriod. As such, COVID-19 data is lagged one-day behind index
rices. Fig. 2 illustrates the daily price of each regional equity3
Table 3
Correlation analysis of the eight COVID-19 growth variables against equity index
prices in each region examined. Although different indicators appear more
strongly correlated in different regions, Total cases emerges as the highest
correlated variable, when averaged across the territories.
COVID-19 growth indicator Index price correlation
China Italy Spain UK USA World
Total cases −0.61 −0.66 −0.70 −0.39 −0.22 −0.16
Total deaths −0.56 −0.61 0.65 −0.39 −0.19 −0.17
New deaths 0.04 −0.57 −0.42 −0.48 −0.37 −0.42
New cases 0.06 −0.55 −0.51 −0.47 −0.41 −0.32
Total death growth 0.27 −0.03 −0.18 −0.37 0.34 0.21
Total case growth 0.23 0.10 0.05 −0.20 −0.11 0.20
New death growth 0.02 −0.14 −0.19 −0.24 −0.19 0.10
New case growth 0.11 −0.14 −0.05 −0.14 −0.02 0.11
index over the period 31st December 2019 to 10th June 2020,
highlighting the sharp initial reaction of global markets to the
onset of the pandemic. Examining both Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 concur-
rently, it can be seen that equity markets responded quickly and
sharply to the initial growth of the virus, before rebounding and
ultimately trending in the same direction as growth in the virus.
The selection of explanatory and control variables detailed in
Section 2.2 are obtained from various sources. Trading Volume,
Volatility Indices, Gold prices, and Brent Crude Oil prices were
sourced from a Bloomberg Terminal. The LIBOR-OIS Spread and
TED Spread (or local alternatives) were sourced from the Federal
Reserve Economic Database (FRED), European Central Bank (ECB),
Bank of England (BOE) and China Central Depository & Clearing
(CCDC), respectively.
Table 5 presents summary statistics detailing the growth of
COVID-19 in all six regions included in this analysis. It can be
seen that the maximum daily index return during the period was
11.37% (USA — Dow Jones Index) on the 29th February, 2020























Fig. 2. The daily price of equity indices from December 31st 2019 to June 10th 2020. 100% = each of the respective market’s equity index price as of close, December
1st 2019. When compared with Fig. 1, it is clear that the initial growth in confirmed cases of COVID-19 was met with a concurrent sharp fall in each of the equity
ndices. However, prices began recovering long before COVID-19 growth rates had peaked.able 4
erritories and equity indices chosen for analysis in this study. Beginning with
hina as the global origin of the virus, the remaining four countries were chosen
s they chronologically established themselves as global epicentres of the virus
ver the course of the pandemic period.
Country Equity index Justification for selection
China SSE 180 Global origin of virus
Italy FTSE MIB First European epicentre
Spain IBEX 35 Second European epicentre
UK FTSE 100 Final European Epicentre
USA DJIA Final global epicentre
World MSCI World Index World
while the minimum daily return was observed as −16.92% (Italy
FTSE MIB) on the 21st February, 2020. In terms of COVID-19
growth, the highest 1-day rise in total cases was 173% (Italy —
2nd February) and the highest 1-day growth in total fatalities
as 460% (Spain – 10th March). It should be noted that large
inimum and maximum figures are biased toward the beginning
f the growth period. These figures signified large increases in
cale while absolute numbers remained relatively small. Of the
ive global epicentres of the virus, Spain saw the largest mean
aily increase in both cases and fatalities (9.47% and 9.98%), while
hina saw the lowest (4.91% and 5.15%).
.2. Variable selection
The objective of this analysis is to determine the impact that
OVID-19 growth had on stock index performance while control-
ing for a number of market factors. Given the short and sharp
rowth of COVID-19, a limited number of market factors were
uitable for inclusion as control variables in our study. A total
f six additional variables per region (in addition to COVID-19
4
growth) are used to explain index prices. In the next section, we
provide details of the market factors, justify their suitability for
the study, and highlight their use in prior literature. The specific
rates and indices used are provided in Tables 8–11 ( Appendix).
Trading Volume: measure of: market activity
As a direct indicator of market activity, trading volumes are
included to assess whether their fluctuations play a role in ex-
plaining index prices in subsequent trading days. Trading volume
is typically used as a proxy for a shift in investor demand –
Campbell et al. (1993) highlight an implicit positive correlation
between price and volume, warranting its inclusion.
Volatility Index: measure of: investor sentiment | volatility
Volatility indices represent the forward expectation of volatil-
ity in financial markets. The index is typically derived from the
price inputs of major index options. Although forward-looking, it
is suitable as a control variable since it is an ex-post measure of
market activity, is considered a proxy for the current sentiment
of investors, and has been shown to be significantly linked with
market returns (Poshakwale et al., 2019).
LIBOR-OIS Spread: measure of: counterparty credit risk | liq-
uidity risk
An overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate is a forward-looking
view on the average target rate for a central facility, for a set
period of time. In the United States, this is often set to be the
Effective Federal Funds Rate (EFFR), an indicator of unsecured
borrowing rates between banking institutions to satisfy liquid-
ity requirements. The probability of counterparty risks occurring
overnight between these institutions is low. Therefore, the OIS
rate is considered a near-riskless rate since credit risk will not
be a major factor in its determination (Sengupta and Tam, 2008).
The indexed rate varies per region. Calculated in largely the same
way as the EFFR, the EONIA, SONIA and SHIBOR Overnight Index
are used in the Eurozone, U.K., and China, respectively.
In contrast, LIBOR is the rate at which banking institutions will
borrow from each other on an unsecured basis for a set period
of time to fund daily operations. While LIBOR USD/GBP are used
in the U.S.A. and the U.K., the EURIBOR and SHIBOR are used in



























Summary statistics for both the stock market equity indices and the COVID-19 data used in this
analysis. The daily log-return was chosen for consistency across indices and to maintain symmetry
in price changes. In relation to the COVID-19 related growth rates, the simple arithmetic growth rate
was used, in line with reporting methods used by several media outlets throughout the pandemic.
All COVID-19 growth rates represent the 1-day growth rate in the cumulative number of cases or
fatalities.
Country Daily growth: Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
(n = 117)
Index returns −0.05% 1.40% −7.63% 3.19%
Total cases 4.91% 12.77% <0.01% 99.33%
Total fatalities 5.15% 13.67% 0.02% 104.15%
(n = 117)
Index returns −0.15% 2.86% −16.92% 8.93%
Total cases 8.70% 30.35% 0.08% 173.46%
Total fatalities 8.47% 24.72% 0.15% 200%
(n = 117)
Index returns −0.20% 2.65% −14.06% 7.82%
Total cases 9.47% 17.65% −0.37% 109.86%
Total fatalities 9.98% 41.63% −6.67% 460%
(n = 117)
Index returns −0.16% 2.35% −10.87% 9.05%
Total cases 9.00% 12.30% −0.211% 69.31%
Total fatalities 8.66% 22.46% 0.14% 180%
(n = 117)
Index returns −0.06% 3.17% −12.93% 11.37%
Total cases 8.85% 14.36% 0.95% 91.63%
Total fatalities 9.16% 21.42% 0.45% 200%
(n = 117)
Index returns −0.08% 2.52% −10.44% 8.41%
Total cases 8.85% 17.04% 0.67% 163.86%
Total fatalities 9.94% 20.76% 0.24% 183.33%the Eurozone and China, respectively. Unlike the OIS rate, LIBOR
is affected by credit and liquidity risk. During times of economic
stress, LIBOR and OIS rates tend to diverge (Brunnermeier, 2009;
Sarkar, 2009). The difference, or spread, between LIBOR and OIS
rates has previously been referred as ‘‘a barometer for fears of
insolvency in the banking sector’’ (Thornton, 2009). A widening
of the LIBOR-OIS spread indicates a deterioration of credit con-
ditions, which may significantly affect market returns (Florackis
et al., 2014). In our analysis, we use the LIBOR-OIS spread as
a proxy for how the level of aggregate liquidity and credit risk
may have changed in the interbank market with the onset of
COVID-19.
TED Spread: measure of: counterparty credit risk | liquidity
isk
The TED Spread is the difference between the yield on a
hree-month U.S. Treasury Bill and the three-month LIBOR USD
ate. This difference represents the risk premium charged on
op-rated interbank loans versus risk-free loans, and so is often
een as an indicator of the perceived credit risk in an econ-
my (Boudt et al., 2017). Therefore, like the LIBOR-OIS spread,
t can also be used as an indicator of overall economic health.
s such, it is a suitable indicator for credit risk and overall
conomic risk during the COVID-19 pandemic. Outside of the US
ED Spread, the yields on generic 3-month government bonds
nd their associated interbank rates were used in this study.
old: measure of: safe-haven asset demand
Gold has been described as a safe-haven asset during turbulent
arket conditions (Baur and Lucey, 2010), with the safe-haven
ffect lasting for up to 15 trading days after an extreme shock.
s such, it is a suitable control variable for the recent shock
f COVID-19 on financial markets and the extended period of
conomic uncertainty that transpired. If gold is a significant in-
ependent variable, it may indicate that stock market prices
ere depressed as a result of investors flocking out of equity
nvestments and into safe-haven assets.
rent Crude Oil: measure of: inflation | global oil price ten-
ions
Oil shares an inverse relationship with stock markets, as with
old (Sakaki, 2019). As oil prices rise, the cost of energy increases,
esulting in systemic inflation in the economy as the overall cost
f doing business rises. In light of the highly volatile global oil5
markets during March 2020 (Masson and Winter, 2020), the price
of oil is a relevant and potentially significant factor in recent stock
market prices.
Guided by relevant financial literature, the above variables
have been chosen to represent several of the dynamics that
typically underlie financial markets. By including measures of
investor sentiment, economic health, counterparty credit risk, liq-
uidity risk, safe-haven asset demand and the price of oil, this anal-
ysis seeks to identify which (if any) of the above were significant
in explaining index prices during the COVID-19 pandemic.
3. Methodology
3.1. Stepwise multiple regression analysis
It is both evident and intuitive that COVID-19 is linked to the
recent downturn in financial markets. We showcase this through
the use of linear regression analyses. The objective of a linear
regression analysis is to find an optimally weighted average of
predictor variables to explain an outcome variable. The objec-
tive of this study is to highlight changes in equity index prices
are significantly explained by the evolution of COVID-19 cases.
Furthermore, we explore whether a number of conventional mar-
ket factors can provide a ‘better’ explanation for the change in
the equity index prices, rather than COVID-19 alone. Therefore,
a combination of control variables that render the ‘COVID-19
cases’ variable non-significant can be justified as the combination
of market factors that influenced equity index price dynamics
during COVID-19. Each model takes the form:
Yi = β0 + β1Xi1 + · · · + βkXik + εi (1)
where β0 describes the intercept and each subsequent βk de-
scribes the optimal explanatory weight associated with each of
the variables Xik. A model is created for each of the territories
outlined in Table 4 (ranging from i = 1 . . . 6), using each of
the variables outlined in Section 2.2 (ranging from k = 1 . . . 7).
With seven potentially-significant, there are 27 potential model
combinations that could be used to explain index prices in each
territory. Therefore, we use forward selection to find the optimal
fit for each model, as measured by the Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC) (Eq. (2)) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
(Eq. (3)). The forward selection method is chosen in order to avoid














































interaction or suppression effects between individual variables.
Model fit is computed as:
AIC = n log (SSE) − n log (n) + 2 (k + 1) (2)
BIC = n log(SSE) − n log (n) + log (n) (k + 1) (3)
where n describes the number of observations, SSE describes
the sum of the squared errors, and k describes the number of
predictors in the model.
The selection method requires consideration given the bal-
ance needed between optimal fit and model parsimony. The AIC
measure penalises for excess variables in the model when assess-
ing goodness-of-fit; it removes these excess variables in order
to prevent overfitting. The BIC performs a similar function and
favours a more parsimonious model as n increases beyond 100
observations (since log (100) = 2). The objective of the analysis
s to find the optimal model for explaining index returns by
uccessively removing non-significant variables. The final model
it may therefore exclude the influence of ‘COVID-19 Growth’ as a
ignificant predictor, while the remaining variables showcase the
arket factors that determined index price fluctuations during
he first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. AIC has been argued
o be better suited for prediction purposes since it favours a
reater closeness of fit, while BIC is better suited for the purposes
f explanation (Shmueli, 2010). Therefore, we base our model
it selection method on the BIC value. In any case, given that
he number of trading days in the analysis is 117 (Table 5), the
ifferences in AIC and BIC scores will be minimal. The analysis is
erformed using the open-source programming language, R.
. Results & discussion
.1. Effect of COVID-19 on equity markets
To confirm whether COVID-19 can explain fluctuations in the
rices of international equity indices, we carry out a set of initial
ross-sectional linear regression analyses. These analyses include
he total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases as an independent
ariable, and each territory’s index price as a dependent variable.
he results are outlined in Table 6. The models are presented
n chronological order as the virus established global epicentres,
oving from China (1), to Italy (2), to Spain (3), to the United
ingdom (4) and finally to the United States (5). The final trad-
ng day we include in our analyses (10th June 2020) coincided
ith the United States being established as the global epicen-
re of COVID-19. Additionally, a model incorporating COVID-19’s
nfluence on the MSCI World Index (6) is included.
The results in Table 6 confirm that COVID-19 was significantly
ssociated with changes in index prices across all regions. The
trongest effects are found in China, Italy, Spain, and the UK. In
hese regions, total COVID-19 cases significantly explain fluctua-
ions in index prices with 99% level of confidence. Smaller effects
re found for the United States (95% level of confidence) and for
he World Index (90% level of confidence), but COVID-19 remains
significant explanatory factor regardless.
Following the results of Table 6, we include conventional
arket factors that could serve as control variables – i.e. market
actors that could explain the variance in index prices that are
therwise explained by COVID-19. Table 7 presents the results of
he six stepwise linear regression models. The models are once
gain presented in chronological order as the virus established
lobal epicentres, moving from China (1), to Italy (2), to Spain
3), to the United Kingdom (4) and finally to the United States
5). The MSCI World Index (6) is again included. All six models
chieved significant model fit, with the variance explained in all
arkets except for China being greater than 90% (Table 7). Theseit statistics represent significant improvements over the models
6
in Table 6, which only included total COVID-19 cases. Implied
volatility, total COVID-19 cases, Brent crude oil prices, and the




Overall, the findings suggest a significant and negative impact
of COVID-19 on major stock market indices. Indices in Spain,
Italy, the U.K., and the U.S.A. were found to be negatively and
significantly related to the total number of COVID-19 cases. This
occurred despite controlling for other market drivers. These find-
ings are in line with those currently available from the ongoing
pandemic. Ashraf (2020), Al-Awadhi et al. (2020), and Sansa
(2020) all report similar findings, with COVID-19 cases negatively
and significantly associated with stock markets in each study.
However, COVID-19 cases did not significantly influence the
sharp fall and subsequent rise of the Chinese SSE 180 index.
Instead, fluctuations in market prices were explained by trading
volumes, the price of Brent crude oil, implied market volatility,
and the TED spread. Similarly, COVID-19 cases did not signif-
icantly influence the MSCI World index. This index represents
large and mid-cap companies in 23 developed markets. Although
global indices may provide the benefits of international diversi-
fication, the findings suggest that in times of serious crisis and
economic disruption, this may not be the case. Instead, changes
in this index can be explained by the level of volatility implied by
the market, the price of Brent crude oil, and the LIBOR-OIS spread
(acting as a barometer for risk-linked market liquidity).
4.2.2. Implied volatility
Implied volatility remained a significant indicator across all
indices, indicating that this may have been the most influential
variable in explaining price fluctuations. This is an unsurprising
result, as measures of implied volatility have historically seen an
inverse relationship with stock prices (Rosillo et al., 2014).
4.2.3. Brent crude oil
The price of Brent crude oil remained positively and statisti-
cally significant for China, the UK, the US, and the MSCI World
index. Amid high tensions in the global oil market, it was un-
surprising that the price of Brent crude oil remained significant
in four of the six regression models. However, the conventional
inverse relationship between oil and stock prices is not present
in the findings. Each coefficient is positive, indicating that in-
creases or decreases in the price of oil is associated with the
same directional movement in index prices. In the case of COVID-
19, this directional relationship makes sense. An unprecedented
erosion of oil demand as a result of pandemic-induced economic
shutdowns initially drove oil prices down, signalling a diminished
level of total economic activity to financial markets. Alongside a
depressed demand, a breakdown in negotiations between OPEC,
Russia and Saudi Arabia resulted in both Saudi Arabia and Russia
announcing unprecedented plans to increase oil production. As
demand continued to diminish due to COVID-19, an additional
surplus in supply led to an oil price war between Russia and Saudi
Arabia with Brent decreasing as much as 26% in early March alone
(Egan, 2020).
Under current COVID-19 conditions, the price of oil may in-
stead act as a gauge of economic activity and of global political
tensions, thus explaining the positive association observed with
index prices. As the price of oil rose from May onwards, so
too did global index prices. Kilian and Park (2009) address this
relationship. They state that the resilience of stock markets in the
presence of increasing oil prices can be explained by strong global






Models (1) to (6) represent the significance of COVID-19 (Total cases) without the control variables included. R2 values for the first three global epicentres of the
pandemic (China, Italy, and Spain) are notably higher than the U.K., the U.S.A., and the World indices. This may be as result of the spatiotemporal nature of COVID-19
growth and the initial market panic observed worldwide, irrespective of the actual location of the virus.




















Total cases −0.006*** −0.022*** −0.009*** −0.003*** −0.001** −0.00002*
(Standard errors) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (0.00001)
Constant 8750.56*** 22,060.59*** 8851.43*** 6696.81*** 26,072.29*** 2166.21***
(Standard errors) (50.95) (323.35) (122.27) (89.40) (331.39) (26.18)
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117
R2 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.15 0.05 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.42 0.49 0.15 0.04 0.02
Res.Std.Error
(df = 115)
262.54 2531.83 967.20 769.19 2849.85 223.26
F Statistic
(df = 1; 115)
67.43*** 86.20*** 111.75*** 20.84*** 5.71** 3.17*
AIC 1639.49 2169.80 1944.62 1891.02 2197.49 1601.56
BIC 1647.78 2178.09 1952.91 1899.31 2205.78 1609.85
Note: *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.able 7
odels (1) to (6) represent the final stepwise regression model for each region under the Bayesian Information Criterion. The price associated with each market
Equity Index Price) is listed from left-to right, beginning with the Chinese SSE 180 index. A number without parentheses represents a regression coefficient while
number inside parentheses represents a standard error.




















Imp. Volatility −16.01*** −129.22*** −49.57*** −27.65*** −121.52*** −7.66***
(Standard errors) (2.24) (4.26) (1.68) (1.73) (12.32) (0.57)
Total cases −0.011*** −0.006*** −0.001*** −0.001**
(Standard errors) (<0.001) (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001)
Brent 9.73*** 20.15*** 68.05*** 4.95***
(Standard errors) (1.94) (2.48) (15.22) (0.58)
LIBOR-OIS −9556.77*** −2953.01*** −68.53***
(Standard errors) (1896.52) (772.99) (22.72)
Gold −1.47*** 6.35***





Constant 8394.71*** 26,399.42*** 10,492.74*** 8939.50*** 16,521.74*** 2207.59***
(Standard errors) (114.00) (173.61) (67.64) (720.99) (3583.43) (38.77)
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117
R2 0.78 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.92 0.93
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.93
Res.Std.Error 156.44 754.01 292.49 155.11 853.13 59.42
(df = 112) (df = 113) (df = 113) (df = 112) (df = 112) (df = 113)
F Statistic 100.12*** 718.50*** 788.79*** 807.10*** 308.73*** 518.42***
(df = 4;112) (df = 3;113) (df = 3;113) (df = 4;112) (df = 4;112) (df = 3;113)
AIC 1521.55 1888.31 1666.72 1519.25 1918.17 1293.76
BIC 1538.12 1902.12 1680.53 1535.83 1934.74 1307.57
Note: p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.demand for industrial commodities, which can more widely be
representative of increasing economic activity. As such, any in-
dication of increasing economic activity during COVID-19 was a
positive indicator to financial markets.
4.2.4. LIBOR-OIS spread
The LIBOR-OIS Spread emerged as statistically significant for
Italy, Spain, in addition to the World index. Before the pandemic,
the IMF (2020b) warned that 40% of corporate debt in major
economies could be at risk in a global downturn. As COVID-19
took hold and economies shutdown, corporate liquidity effec-
tively dried up, and the LIBOR-OIS spread rose to the highest level7
seen since the global financial crisis of 2007–2009. Companies
began drawing on short-term credit lines in order to shore up
balance sheets, with over $120 trillion drawn by European and
American companies in less than one month (Platt et al., 2020).
As pandemic-induced shutdowns took hold, consumer demand
diminished, corporations drew increasingly on short-term credit
lines, and the demand for liquid assets increased significantly
(Bank of England, 2020a).
The significance of the LIBOR-OIS spread for Spain and Italy,
but not for the United States, is a compelling finding from this
study. One possible explanation is rooted in the response of


















































central institutions to the pandemic. The Federal Reserve no-
tably responded swiftly, reducing the Federal Funds Rate by 50
basis points (0.5%) in an attempt to promote investment and a
greater level of economic activity. In the same announcement,
daily overnight secured loans up to at least $175 billion were
provided, alleviating money market pressures and ensuring an
ample supply of reserves (Federal Reserve, 2020). This injection of
confidence to the market importantly came just before tensions
in the global oil markets emerged.
On the other hand, the ECB lagged briefly in their response
Collins and Gagnon, 2020), possibly due to the asynchronicity of
he member states. The difference in policy response may explain
hy the LIBOR-OIS remained significant in European markets, but
ot American. These findings are similar to those of Ramelli and
agner (2020), who found that corporate debt and cash holdings
merged as important value drivers as the virus spread to Europe
nd the United States.
.2.5. Gold
Gold did not act as a safe-haven or a ‘flight-to-safety’ asset
Akyildirim et al., 2020) during the downturn for the majority
f territories, with a significant result only observed for the UK
nd US indices. Our findings are consistent with the findings of
orbet et al. (2020). As in their analysis, we find no significant
elationship between Gold and Chinese stock markets in the
urrent pandemic. It can be suggested that in times of serious
inancial and economic disruption, gold fails to act as a safe-haven
nd may instead act as an amplifier of financial contagion.
.2.6. TED spread & trading volume
The TED spread and Trading Volume indicators were only sig-
ificant in influencing the Chinese SSE 180 index. This result may
ikely be due to the similarity between the LIBOR-OIS spread and
he TED spread. We find that the U.S. TED spread and the LIBOR-
IS shared a correlation of over 98% over the period analysed.
onversely, China’s equivalent measure of the TED Spread (3M
HIBOR minus 3M ChinaBond Yield) shared a correlation of 64%,
otentially explaining its inclusion in model (1) but not in any
ther model. The effects of the trading volume, however, can be
easoned in conjunction with the spread of the virus. While the
OVID-19 crisis appeared on paper to have effectively abated in
hina by the beginning of March, the other regions examined
ere just beginning to experience the pandemic. The swiftness
ith which controls were implemented in China could possibly
ave tamed the effects of the virus on markets much quicker,
endering it a non-significant parameter.
.3. Viral outbreaks on international markets: Past and present
The current literature on viral outbreaks is limited to an ex-
ent, as the scale of the current COVID-19 pandemic has been
nseen in over a century. As such, the implications of COVID-
9 may be guided by examining prior viral outbreaks. SARS was
onsistently referred to as a template for how COVID-19 may
mpact the economy and stock markets (Avalos and Zakrajšek,
020; Decambre, 2020). However, despite a peak-to-trough stock
rice movement of 17.3% on the S&P 500, Nippani and Washer
2004) declared SARS a ‘non-event’ for affected countries’ stock
arkets overall. Similarly, Loh (2006) found that the negative
epercussions of SARS on airline stocks surfaced in the form of
ncreased volatilities rather than lower mean returns. Conversely,
hen et al. (2007) analysed Taiwanese hotel stock prices in the
ftermath of SARS, and found that stock prices showed significant
nd abnormal negative returns on and after the day of the SARS
utbreak. Despite a lack of consensus on the direct stock market
mplications, the overall financial cost of the SARS outbreak was8
unequivocally significant, with Delisle (2003) finding the losses
to exceed that of the Asian financial crisis, estimating losses of $3
trillion in GDP and $2 trillion in financial market equity.
Looking at the implications of the Spanish Flu of 1918–1919,
Garrett (2008) found that cities with higher rates of influenza
mortalities experienced higher real wage growth and higher in-
come growth in the decade proceeding the pandemic. These
findings echo those of Brainerd and Siegler (2003), who found
the Spanish Flu led to an increase in U.S. economic growth in the
1920s. However, war-time economics and post-war optimism are
heavily confounding factors in any analysis of the stock market
during the Spanish Flu, so it may not provide a clear comparison
for the present COVID-19 pandemic. Ichev and Marinč (2018)
and Del Giudice and Paltrinieri (2017) investigated the impact of
the Ebola virus outbreak on U.S. and African financial markets,
respectively. Ichev and Marinč (2018) observed a negative impact
on U.S. listed stocks with business operations exposed to West
Africa. It is clear there is a lack of consensus regarding the direct
impact of viral outbreaks on stock markets. Despite noteworthy
economic and financial losses, evidence of a sustained and signif-
icant negative impact on stock markets is inconclusive from prior
outbreaks.
Nevertheless, this study highlights the market factors that
are key in explaining index prices beyond COVID-19 growth.
This analysis builds on the current COVID-19 related research by
encompassing the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, from
31st December 2019 to 10th June 2020. We find, with over 90%
of the variance explained in price fluctuations, that COVID-19
significantly influenced equity markets in Spain, Italy, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. This result persisted even in the
presence of control variables. However, COVID-19 growth did not
significantly affect the Chinese SSE 180 index, nor did it affect the
MSCI World index. Instead, changes in these respective market
prices were explained by implied market volatility and the price
of Brent crude oil. The SSE 180 index was additionally influenced
by trading volumes and the TED spread, while the MSCI World
index was additionally influenced by the LIBOR-OIS spread.
4.4. Implications of results
Despite the rarity of pandemics, it is a distinct possibility that
we will encounter further ‘adversarial events’ that can signifi-
cantly disrupt societies and impact the global economy. There-
fore, the current pandemic gives us a unique opportunity to
identify insights that can inform preparations for future adver-
sarial events. Firstly, early efforts to taper market panic could
have prevented large price fluctuations. Our results indicate that
investor sentiment impacted market prices before any observ-
able financial damage was incurred. The association between the
early negative shock to equity prices and investor sentiment is
consistent with the belief that variations in the values of stock
markets are largely due to changes in expected returns, rather
than revisions in expected financial growth rates (Campbell and
Shiller, 1988; Gormsen and Koijen, 2020).
Secondly, the results suggest that early interventions to limit
the spread of COVID-19 can be effective in limiting the impact on
equity markets. China curtailed the spread of the virus by early
March (Zhang et al., 2020), coinciding with the time the virus was
declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation (2020a).
In contrast, the remaining territories (Italy, Spain, UK, US) did
not immediately implement curtailing measures, exacerbating
the spread of the virus and its effect on equity markets. Based on
our findings, China’s early interventions may have rendered the
effect of COVID-19 a non-significant factor in explaining changes
in index prices. On the other hand, research emerging from He
et al. (2020) may indicate under-reported COVID-19 cases within

















































official Chinese data. Using epidemiological growth models, cre-
mation estimates and Chinese official data, the study finds a
reasonable death-toll estimate of more than ten times the mag-
nitude of the official death toll recorded. Thus, it is also possible
that a potentially spurious dataset is currently available for the
analysis of COVID-19 in some territories. Future work should
therefore consider all available and reasonable data sources, in
order to gain a thorough understanding of the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Thirdly, our findings for the changes in MSCI World Index
rices lends evidence to the importance of the timing of COVID-
9 growth, as it relates to financial markets. The global epicentre
f COVID-19 shifted on a number of occasions. Beginning in China,
t spread to Europe, and then to the United States. We find that
rice movements in all localised markets (apart from China) are
argely explained by the growth in total COVID-19 cases. On the
ther hand, the growth in COVID-19 cases did not significantly
xplain the extensive fluctuations in the MSCI World Index. Since
he aforementioned regions were not all significantly affected by
OVID-19 at once, we theorise that a strong association between
he MSCI World index and COVID-19 did not manifest due to the
hifting spatiotemporal nature of COVID-19 growth.
. Conclusion
This study examined the response of equity index prices to
he ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. We hypothesise that the daily
otal count of confirmed COVID-19 cases served as a significant
actor in influencing market prices. Our analysis builds on the
urrent literature in two ways. Firstly, we investigate whether
rowth in COVID-19 played a significant role in international
arket prices (China, Italy, Spain, UK, US, World). Our findings
onfirm that equity index prices suffered a significant negative
hock in conjunction with the growth of the pandemic. Sec-
ndly, we investigate whether this relationship persisted while
ontrolling for a number of conventional market drivers. Specifi-
ally, we investigate whether the growth in COVID-19 cases was
ignificant at explaining regional index prices, while controlling
or investor sentiment, counterparty credit risk, liquidity risk,
afe-haven asset demand and the price of oil.
The current pandemic provides us with a unique opportunity
o identify the effect that pandemics have on financial markets.
he results suggest that the implied volatility of the respective
arkets, often used as a proxy for investor sentiment, played a
reater role in explaining market prices than COVID-19 growth.
ll major index prices included in this analysis were largely ex-
lained by this factor. Our findings indicate that investors began
o act before any realised financial damage was observed. We
dditionally find that changes in the Chinese SSE 180 index and
he MSCI World index prices were not significantly explained by
OVID-19 growth. Instead, these indices were largely influenced
y conventional market drivers linked to economic growth. We
heorise, based on these results, that early interventions by China
ay have played a role in index price fluctuations. As noted above
owever, the validity of current data in the early stages of a global
andemic must also be considered. We also theorise that the
hanging spatiotemporal nature of the virus also played a distinct
ole in index price fluctuations. Given the ongoing nature of the
urrent pandemic, and the further shift in epicentre location to







China CBOE China ETF Volatility Index (VXFXI)
Italy EURO STOXX 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX)
Spain EURO STOXX Volatility Index (VSTOXX)
UK EURO STOXX Volatility Index (VSTOXX)
USA CBOE DJIA Volatility Index (VXD)
World CBOE Volatility Index (VIX)
Table 9
Overnight indexed swap rates.
Country Index
China SHIBOR Fixing Overnight Index Rate
Italy Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA)
Spain Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA)
UK Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA)
USA Effective Federal Funds Rate




China Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR)
Italy Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR)
Spain Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR)
UK London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR GBP)
USA London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR USD)




3M Bond Yield on 3M Generic Government Bond
Gold Brent Crude Oil (C01) Bloomberg
Oil Spot Price of Gold (XAU) Bloomberg
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